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PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS   








This paper refutes the conventional wisdom, bolstered in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis that governments should not become too friendly with the private sector but, instead, 
should remain neutral and at arms-length distance. The empirical findings presented here 
indicate that countries in which governments have forged close and cooperative working 
relationships with the private sector have had much greater economic success. Furthermore, 
countries with more business-friendly public-private sector relationships tend to exhibit 
greater positive responsiveness to pro-growth policy reforms. In many developing countries 
today, where public-private sector relationships are characterized more by mistrust than 
cooperation, more not less collaboration is needed to spur economic growth. The art of 
governance, however, is avoiding state capture and not letting this partnership degenerate 
into favoritism and cronyism. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Choosing the right policies to promote economic growth and development is, of 
course, essential. Countries that have relied on free, open and competitive markets and 
maintained macroeconomic stability have generally performed better than those that 
have not adopted these policies (Fischer (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995)). The 
high-performing economies of East Asia are often cited as a dramatic example of this 
success (Leipziger and Thomas (1993)). However, there are developing countries today 
that have also moved in this same, more liberalized, policy direction, albeit more 
recently, but have not yet experienced sustained rapid economic growth. Why do the 
same pro-growth policies that succeed in one country fail or have little impact in 
another? Is it just that not enough time has elapsed or that the policy dosage is still too 
small? 
In seeking to answer these questions, this paper tests the hypothesis that the quality 
of public-private sector relationships or, more specifically, the degree of trust and MARTIN J. STAAB  2 
cooperation between government and private sector agents, is an important factor that 
needs to be taken into account in explaining differences in economic performance across 
countries with similar policy regimes.
1  Just getting policies right, as important as that is, 
may not be enough to promote growth and development in countries where strong and 
effective public-private sector relationships are lacking. 
To measure public-private sector relationships, an index, called the Business- 
Friendly (B-F) Index, is constructed. The B-F Index is tested in a multiple regression 
model to estimate its importance in explaining economic performance. Panel data are 




2.    DEFINING PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Most studies of public-private sector relationships tend to concentrate on the 
functional nature of these relationships or, more specifically, on the obstacles, mainly 
defined in terms of the policies and actions taken by government, to doing business in a 
country (Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998)). However, the focus here is not these 
“rules of the game” as such, but rather on the manner in which they are implemented. 
The term “relationship” describes how civil servants, charged with the responsibility of 
implementing policies, and private sector agents, who must respond to those incentives, 
interact in terms of the mutual trust and support that are provided. At one end of this 
spectrum, are those relationships where governments are generally helpful, friendly and 
supportive, and, at the other end, are those mostly dysfunctional, predatory or 
adversarial relationships in which governments may regard the private sector only as a 
source of economic rents. One implication of this definition is that governments with 
similar functional responsibilities (e.g., market-oriented economies) could have quite 
different (friendly or unfriendly) public-private sector relationships. Therefore, one 
cannot, automatically assume that market-friendly implies business-friendly.   
Furthermore, business-friendly should not be confused with cronyism, which refers 
to favoritism or the preferential treatment accorded a select number of businesses or 
individuals. To the contrary, the B-F Index is intended to measure how the public sector 




1 Mahbub ul Haq (1997) was one of the first to recognize the importance of this relationship. After 
comparing South Asia’s economic performance with East Asia’s, and finding that the usually cited factors 
(human and physical capital and outward orientation), cannot adequately explain the differences, Haq 
concludes that the missing explanation lies in the close, cooperative relationship between the public and 
private sectors in East Asia in contrast to the paternalistic relationship in South Asia.   PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  3 
3.  THE  BUSINESS-FRIENDLY  INDEX 
 
The B-F Index is composed of four subcomponents. Each subcomponent and the 
construction of the B-F Index are described below. 
 
3.1.  The  Subcomponents 
 
3.1.1.  Government  Supportiveness 
 
One way by which to gauge government supportiveness is to examine the pattern of 
public expenditure. For example, public investment in infrastructure, such as transport, 
power, water and telecommunications, directly supports and enhances the productivity 
of private sector investments (Blejer and Khan (1984), Greene and Villanueva (1991), 
Wai and Wong (1982), and Hadjimichael et al. (1995)). Because per capita power 
consumption is correlated with the other indices of infrastructure adequacy and has the 
advantage of having data available for a large number of developing countries over the 
last several decades, it was used as a proxy for this subcomponent.
2 
 
3.1.2.  Government  Disposition Towards the Private Sector 
 
To help capture the manner and mindset, either friendly or otherwise, by which 
governments relate to private enterprises, a second subcomponent was defined. Because 
business-friendly governments generally do not tax business enterprises excessively, 
especially when alternative and more efficient ways to raise tax revenue exist, the 
highest marginal rate of corporate taxation was used as a proxy for this subcomponent. 
To define this subcomponent positively, the highest marginal rate of corporate taxation 




2 During the last two decades, developing countries depended heavily on the public sector to supply 
electric power. Recently a few countries have allowed independent power producers to supply power to the 
national grid and, in some cases, directly to private distribution companies under the oversight of public 
regulatory agencies. Thus, the public sector has either been directly involved in the supply of power or, more 
recently, in a few cases, it has worked with and/or provided the enabling environment for the private sector. 
For this reason, per capita power consumption is probably a good indicator of the general supportiveness of 
the public sector, if not, in all cases, an indicator of public outlays. The data on per capita power consumption 
are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (CD-ROM 2000). 
3 For the 1990s, the data on corporate tax rates were drawn from the World Bank’s World Development 
Reports; for the 1980s, the data were obtained from the primary source, Price Waterhouse Coopers.   MARTIN J. STAAB  4 
3.1.3.  Ensuring  Business  Security 
 
Another measure of public-private sector friendliness is the extent to which 
governments ensure the security of doing business. If the judicial system does not 
provide low cost and impartial means for adjudicating disputes or if there is risk of 
expropriation or repudiation of contracts by government, public-private sector 
relationships are likely to be characterized by suspicion and mistrust. Survey data, 




3.1.4.    Government Openness and Helpfulness 
 
Cooperative and friendly public-private sector relationships are also likely to entail 
the sharing of information as well as a civil service that is willing and able to assist the 
entire business community in complying with the nation’s laws and regulations. Even in 
countries where market-friendly policies exist, they can be easily undermined if 
important information is not readily available or businesses have to overcome costly 
government bureaucratic hurdles. Two variables from the ICRG data series (quality of 
the bureaucracy and corruption in government) were used to measure this 
subcomponent.
5 It is principally through this subcomponent, that the prevalence of 
cronyism or favoritism can be gauged. 
 
3.2.    Constructing the B-F Index 
 
To construct the composite B-F Index, first the values for the subcomponents were 
normalized by establishing minimum and maximum values for each subcomponent.
6 
The value for each subcomponent was then calculated using the following formula:
7 
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4 Values for three ICRG variables (rule of law, expropriation risk and repudiation of contracts) were 
combined to derive values for this subcomponent. The rule of law variable is on a 6-point scale, which was 
converted to a 10-point scale, consistent with the other two variables. Knack and Keefer (2000), in defining 
their variable “property and contractual rights,” use a slightly broader measure. 
5 These two variables, originally on a 6-point scale, were converted to a 10-point scale. 
6 For the two subcomponents based on survey data (security of doing business and government openness), 
the minimum and maximum values correspond to the survey scale, which ranges from 0 to 10 after 
adjustment. For the two other observable subcomponents, the range is defined by their actual distributions. 
7 The same method is used by the UNDP (1997) in calculating the human development index (HDI).   PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  5 
where: 
th
1 j X j = subcomponent of the B-F Index ) ( 1 X , 
       ) ( 1 actual X j = actual value of j X1 , 
          j X1 (min) = minimum value of j X1 , 
       j X1 (max) = maximum value of j X1 .  
 
Lastly, the B-F Index was calculated by taking the simple arithmetic mean of the 
four subcomponents. Values range from 0 (the least friendly) to 1 (the most cooperative 
and supportive) and were calculated for 73 developing countries for which data were 
available over the 18-year period, 1980-1997. Table 1 shows the correlation matrix for 
the four subcomponents, all of which are positively correlated and, therefore, pulling in 
the same direction. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
4.1.  Country  Rankings 
 
Table 2 shows the ranking of countries according to the B-F Index for the 1980s and 
1990s. Table 3 summarizes this same information by geographical region. Over the two 
decades, governments in all of the countries in the sample, without exception, moved 
towards a more cooperative and friendly relationship with the private sector. The 
average country improved its score on the B-F scale by 0.15 points. 
Not surprisingly, the original Asian “Tigers” (Singapore and Korea) and some newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) - Thailand and Malaysia - are at the top of the B-F scale, 
while many South Asian, Central American and African countries are near the bottom. 
However, there are some notable exceptions. Indonesia, often grouped with the NICs, 
has a relatively low ranking on the B-F scale and the African countries of Botswana, 
Namibia, the Gambia, and Guinea have relatively high scores. In fact, in the 1990s MARTIN J. STAAB  6 
Botswana recorded the second highest score after Singapore. However, in terms of 
overall regional averages, East Asia in the 1990s had the highest scores, followed by 





Table 2.    Ranking of Countries by B-F Index 
Rank 1980-89  1990-97   1997   
1  Singapore 0.64  Singapore 0.79  Singapore 0.86 
2  Botswana 0.58  Botswana 0.70  Namibia  0.80 
3  Papua New Guinea  0.57  Korea, Rep.  0.69  Korea, Rep.  0.74 
4  Niger  0.53 Namibia  0.68 Botswana  0.69 
5  Burkina Faso  0.48  Papua New Guinea  0.64  Papua New Guinea  0.67 
6  Gambia 0.48  Gambia 0.63  Gambia 0.67 
7  Malaysia  0.48 Saudi  Arabia  0.60 Malawi  0.64 
8  Madagascar  0.47 Guinea  0.59 Malaysia  0.64 
9  Malawi  0.46 Thailand  0.58 Chile  0.63 
10  Brazil  0.45 Malawi  0.58 Saudi  Arabia  0.63 
11  Sierra  Leone  0.45 Malaysia  0.58 Guinea  0.60 
12  Trinidad & Tobago  0.44  South Africa  0.58  Trinidad & Tobago  0.60 
13  Saudi Arabia  0.44  Trinidad & Tobago  0.58  Thailand  0.59 
14  Costa  Rica  0.43 Chile  0.57 South  Africa  0.59 
15  Chile  0.43 Brazil  0.57 Jamaica  0.59 
16  Korea, Rep.  0.43  Costa Rica  0.57  Uganda  0.59 
17  Venezuela 0.42  Venezuela 0.57  Jordan  0.59 
18  Thailand  0.41 Burkina  Faso  0.56 Costa  Rica  0.58 
19  Cote  d'Ivoire  0.41 Madagascar  0.55 Burkina  Faso  0.58 
20  South  Africa  0.41 Argentina  0.54 Venezuela  0.57 
21  Togo  0.39 Niger  0.54 Brazil  0.57 
22  Mexico  0.38 Jordan  0.54 Uruguay  0.57 
23  Colombia  0.38 China  0.54 Argentina  0.56 
24  India  0.38 Turkey  0.53 Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0.56 
25  Uruguay  0.38 Mexico  0.53 Madagascar  0.56 
26  Ecuador  0.37 Uganda  0.53 Tunisia  0.55 
27  Turkey  0.37 Togo  0.53 Morocco  0.55 
28  Argentina  0.37 Jamaica  0.52 Sri  Lanka  0.55 
29  Gabon  0.37 Uruguay  0.51 India  0.55 
30  Kenya  0.36  Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.51  Togo  0.55 
31  Guinea  0.36 Morocco  0.51 Turkey  0.54 
32  Cameroon  0.36 Zimbabwe  0.51 China  0.53 
33  Zimbabwe  0.36 India  0.50 Philippines  0.53 
34  China  0.35 Tunisia  0.50 Mexico  0.53 
35  Guinea-Bissau  0.34  Syrian Arab Rep.  0.50  Dominican Rep.  0.52 
36  Tunisia  0.34 Ghana  0.50 Ecuador  0.52 
37  Senegal  0.34 Colombia  0.50 Pakistan  0.52 
38  Dominican  Rep.  0.34 Ecuador  0.50 Vietnam  0.52 
39  Jordan  0.33 Nicaragua  0.49 Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  0.52 
40  Mozambique  0.33 Cote  d'Ivoire  0.49 Indonesia  0.52 
 
8 South Asia’s relatively low ranking is due mainly to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. India, 
whose score has substantially improved since the 1980s, occupies the middle range. PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  7 
Table 2.  (Continued) 
Rank 1980-89  1990-97   1997   
41  Sri  Lanka  0.33 Kenya  0.48 Yemen,  Rep.  0.52 
42  Jamaica  0.33 Indonesia  0.48 Zimbabwe  0.52 
43  Algeria  0.32 Gabon  0.48 Kenya  0.51 
44  Uganda  0.32 Dominican  Rep.  0.48 Ghana  0.51 
45  Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.31  Cameroon  0.48  Sierra Leone  0.51 
46  Morocco  0.31 Algeria  0.47 Nicaragua  0.50 
47  Tanzania 0.31  Tanzania 0.47  Paraguay 0.50 
48  Nicaragua  0.30 Yemen,  Rep.  0.47 Cameroon  0.50 
49  Zambia  0.30 Paraguay  0.47 Algeria  0.50 
50  Mali  0.30 Guinea-Bissau  0.46 El  Salvador  0.49 
51  Vietnam  0.29 Mozambique  0.46 Peru  0.49 
52  Peru  0.29 Sri  Lanka  0.46 Mozambique  0.49 
53  Angola  0.29 Mali  0.46 Gabon  0.49 
54  Panama  0.29 Sierra  Leone  0.46 Niger  0.49 
55  Pakistan  0.29 Peru  0.46 Tanzania  0.48 
56  Ethiopia  0.28 Vietnam  0.45 Mali  0.48 
57  Paraguay  0.28 Philippines  0.44 Panama  0.48 
58  Ghana  0.28 Pakistan  0.44 Bolivia  0.48 
59  Honduras  0.27 Zambia  0.43 Guatemala  0.47 
60  Syrian Arab Rep.  0.26  Panama  0.43  Colombia  0.47 
61  Nigeria  0.25 Bolivia  0.43 Zambia  0.47 
62  Guatemala  0.24 Senegal  0.43 Angola  0.47 
63  Yemen, Rep.  0.24  El Salvador  0.42  Guinea-Bissau  0.46 
64  Indonesia  0.24 Nigeria  0.42 Ethiopia  0.46 
65  El  Salvador  0.24 Honduras  0.41 Cote  d'Ivoire  0.46 
66  Philippines  0.23 Angola  0.41 Bangladesh  0.45 
67  Bolivia  0.21 Guatemala  0.40 Senegal  0.44 
68 Haiti  0.20  Ethiopia  0.38 Nigeria  0.43 
69  Congo  D.R.  0.20 Bangladesh  0.38 Honduras  0.43 
70 Bangladesh  0.19  Congo  D.R. 0.36  Haiti  0.41 
71  Benin 0.19  Benin 0.35  Congo  D.R.  0.36 
72  Nepal 0.19  Nepal 0.35  Benin 0.35 
73     Haiti  0.32  Nepal  0.35 
          
Average   0.35   0.50   0.53 
Note: The B-F Index ranges in value from 1 (the most friendly and cooperative) to 0 (the least friendly). 
 
 
Table 3.    Ranking of Regions by B-F Index 
Rank  1980-89  1990-97  
1  East Asia  .40  East Asia  .58 
2  South America  .36  South America  .51 
3  Sub-Saharan Africa  .36  Middle East & N. Afr.  .51 
4  Middle East & N. Afr.  .33  Sub-Saharan Africa  .50 
5  Central America & Carib.  .31  Central America & Carib.  .46 
6  South Asia  .27  South Asia  .43 
 MARTIN J. STAAB  8 
Regions 
Mexico   Sub-Saharan  Africa    Middle East & N. Afr. 
   Mozambique    Yemen,  Rep. 
    Ethiopia    Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Central America & Carib.   Tanzania    Morocco 
Haiti    Malawi    Syrian Arab Rep. 
Dominican Rep.    Sierra Leone    Algeria 
Nicaragua   Niger    Tunisia 
Honduras    Burkina Faso    Saudi Arabia 
Guatemala   Madagascar    Turkey 
Jamaica   Uganda    Jordan 
El Salvador    Guinea-Bissau     
Costa Rica    Mali     
Panama   Nigeria    East  Asia 
Trinidad & Tobago    Kenya    Vietnam 
   Togo    China 
   Gambia    Indonesia 
South America   Benin    Philippines 
Bolivia    Ghana    Papua New Guinea 
Ecuador   Zambia    Korea,  Rep. 
Paraguay   Angola   Singapore 
Colombia   Zimbabwe    Thailand 
Peru   Guinea    Malaysia 
Venezuela   Senegal     
Brazil   Cameroon     
Chile    Cote d'Ivoire    South Asia 
Uruguay   Congo  D.R.    Bangladesh 
Argentina   Namibia   India 
   Botswana    Pakistan 
    South Africa    Sri Lanka 
   Gabon    Nepal 
 
 
In addition, there does not appear to be a close one to one relationship between 
government functional responsibilities and the B-F Index. Countries with a high as well 
as low degree of state control in the economy are on both ends of the B-F scale.
9 
 
9 For example, China, with a strong state presence, has a relatively intermediate B-F score (.54 in the 
1990s), while other economies in which the state also plays a large role (e.g., Ethiopia, Zambia and Pakistan) 
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Similarly, countries that depend more on markets are also found along the entire 
spectrum.
10 Thus, while market- oriented economies are, on average, likely to have 
higher B-F scores than economies that rely more heavily on the state, there are enough 
exceptions to warrant not taking this association for granted. Consequently, business- 
friendly should not be equated with market-friendly. 
Finally it should be noted that of the 73 developing countries for which B-F scores 
were calculated in the 1990s, 35, or almost half, had scores below .50, and 54 countries 
(74 %) had scores below .55. While some of these countries are more business-friendly 
than others, none at this level are exactly a paragon of public-private sector cooperation. 
To the contrary, all represent serious dysfunctional associations. Thus, while public- 
private sector relationships are clearly improving, this relationship is still characterized 
more by mistrust than cooperation in many developing countries today. 
 
4.2.  Econometric  Analysis  
 
To estimate the significance of the B-F Index in explaining variations in the growth 
and development performance of developing countries after accounting for policy 
differences, multivariate regression analysis is used. A total of six economic 
performance or dependent variables are each regressed against the B-F Index and seven 
other independent policy variables.
11 
 
4.2.1.  Variables 
 
The six dependent economic performance variables include: (i) GDP growth 
(gdpgr); (ii) per capita GDP growth (pcgdpgr); (iii) manufacturing growth (mgr); (iv) the 
proportion of manufactures in total commodity exports (mx); (v) the savings rate (s); and 
(vi) financial depth (fd).
12  All of these performance measures are particularly important 
 
have relatively low scores (.38, .43, and .44, respectively in the 1990s). 
10 For example, the market economies of Nigeria, El Salvador and Guatemala are ranked near the bottom 
on the B-F scale (.42, .42 and .40, respectively in the 1990s), while Singapore, Korea and Thailand are on the 
top (.79, .69 and .58, respectively in the 1990s). Even Nicaragua, despite recent efforts to move from a 
command to a market economy, continues to have a relatively low score (.49).   
11 The principal objectives of this specification are to test the significance of the B-F Index in explaining 
economic performance after controlling for policy differences and to use these estimated regressions to 
analyze the importance of the B-F Index in explaining variations in economic performance across countries 
with similar policy regimes. It is not to explain economic growth as such, for which the inclusion of some 
additional, non-policy independent variables might be warranted. However, including these other variables, 
some of which are themselves influenced by the policy variables, would tend to obscure whatever inferences 
could be drawn about the importance of the B-F Index and the effectiveness of economic policy.   
12 Financial depth is measured by the proportion of liquid assets (M2) to GDP. MARTIN J. STAAB  10 
to developing countries, concerned with increasing their capital stock, transforming their 
industrial and trade sectors and generally accelerating economic growth.
13  
The independent variables include, in addition to the B-F Index: two macroeconomic 
policy variables - inflation (inf), as measured by the consumer price index, and the 
central government’s fiscal balance, expressed as a proportion of GDP (fb); a trade 
policy variable, represented by the average tariff (tar); an exchange rate management 
variable represented by the real exchange rate (reer); a privatization policy variable, 
represented by the rate of disinvestment in state-owned enterprises, expressed as a 
proportion of total gross domestic investment (insoe); a financial policy variable, the real 
interest rate (rint), aimed at measuring the extent or absence of financial repression; and 
a human capital investment policy variable, represented by the amount of expenditure 
per primary school student as a proportion of per capita GNP (epspc).
14 
 
4.2.2.  Regression  Results 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 4. In all the specifications, the B-F 
Index enters with the expected positive sign and is statistically significant. The partial 
scatter plots, with each of the six dependent performance variables regressed against the 
B-F index, are shown in Figure 1.
15  Clearly countries with higher B-F scores do better, 
in terms of economic performance, than countries with lower scores and the strength of 
this relationship is highly robust after controlling for a number of important economic 
policies.
16 
To further test the robustness of this relationship, a period dummy was introduced to 
see if there are any time-specific peculiarities associated with either of the two time 
periods (1980s and 1990s), and the composition of the countries in the sample was 
changed to determine if outliers might be influencing the result. With the inclusion of 
the period dummy, the results remain virtually unchanged.
17 To account for the 
influence of outliers, first the high performers (Singapore, Korea, Thailand and 
 
13 The data for all these variables are drawn from the World Development Indicators. 
14 The data for these variables, with the exception of the average tariff, taken from the World Bank’s 
sectoral database, are drawn from the World Development Indicators. 
15 With all of the policy regressors in, the B-F index remains highly significant at the 1 percent level in 
the case of five of the six dependent performance variables and, in the case of the other performance variable, 
mx, it is significant at the 5 percent level. 
16 A test was carried out to determine to what extent these results and the B-F Index have been influenced 
or dominated by the subcomponent represented by per capita power consumption, as this variable also tends 
to be closely correlated with the level, if not the growth, of economic activity. The B-F Index, therefore, was 
redefined to exclude this subcomponent. However, even with this subcomponent removed, the B-F Index 
remained highly significant at the 1 % level and robust to the inclusion of all the right hand policy variables. 
17 Only in the specification with the dependent variable mx, does the B-F index lose its significance.     PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  11 
Malaysia) were excluded from the data set, and, secondly, all of South Asia, the region 
with the lowest average B-F scores in both decades, was removed. However, the 
exclusion of these high and low outliers does not significantly affect the results.
18 In 




Table 4.  OLS  Regression  Results 
Dependent Variables 
Variables 





  6.91 -33.06
*** 
  (-2.17) (-3.02) (-3.07) (-1.19) (1.14) (-2.55) 















  (-3.28) (-2.72) (-3.98) (-1.86) (-7.46) (-2.15) 
fb 0.22  0.26  0.90
***  0.21 0.81
***  0.29 








  (3.25) (3.75) (4.09) (2.89) (4.48) (3.85) 
reer 0.02
**  0.01 0.04
***  -0.07 -0.05
***  -0.03 
  (2.21) (1.48) (4.67) (-1.28) (-2.50) (-1.15) 
insoe -0.02  -0.03  0.01 0.14 0.10
*  0.14 
  (-0.40) (-0.62) (0.22)  (0.65) (1.89) (0.83) 
rint 0.10
*  0.12
**  0.08 0.23 0.04 0.09 
  (1.76) (2.04) (1.01) (0.78) (0.55) (0.54) 
epspc -0.02 0.00 0.30 0.88 -0.36 0.69 
  (-0.11) (-0.03) (1.01)  (1.09) (-2.56) (1.29) 
R
2  0.32 0.33 0.45 0.28 0.71 0.46 
obs. 78 78 77 74 78 78 
Notes: 
1) The t-statistics are in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 
2) *(** , ***) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 









































































































Note: The partial scatter plots show the relationship between the dependent performance variable and the B-F 
Index when all other independent policy variables in the multiple regression are held constant.   
 
 
Figure 1.    Partial Scatter Plots For B-F Index and Dependent Performance Variables PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  13 
4.2.3.  Simulations 
 
To examine more closely the case of countries with similar policy regimes yet 
disparate economic performance, the following question was posed: how would 
economic performance have been affected had countries in the 1990s adopted the same 
policy regime, say, for example, as that in the most successful developing countries (i.e., 
Asian “Tigers” and NICs) but maintained their own public-private sector relationships, 
as reflected in actual B-F Index scores? The results, using the estimated multiple 
regression models, are presented and compared with actual outcomes for the 1990s in 
Table 5.   
For about a third of the total countries, the changes are dramatic. These countries 
recorded at least a 3.5 percentage point acceleration in GDP growth (gdpgr).
19 For these 
countries, policies clearly matter. About another third of the countries showed moderate 
growth responses and, in the remaining third, the response was small or negligible. The 
countries in this latter category registered less than a 1.5 percentage point acceleration in 
GDP growth (gdpgr).
20 If the more comprehensive indicator, per capita income growth 
(pcgdpgr) is used to measure performance, this list of countries with low response rates 
expands to include four more countries.
21 For the other performance variables, the 
results are similar, with the proportion of countries showing little or no response ranging 
from 33 to 38 %.
22 
In general, most of the countries with low performance responses also have 
comparatively low B-F scores. To examine this relationship more closely, an elasticity 
coefficient was calculated which measures the absolute percentage change in a country’s 
performance, as represented by each of the six performance variables, in response to the 
absolute percentage change in the sum of all the policy changes. The formula is: 
 
19 These countries include: Nicaragua, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Brazil, 
Mexico, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Togo, the Gambia, 
Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and 
Papua New Guinea. 
20 These countries include: Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Yemen, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, 
Senegal, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. 
21 This includes the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Uruguay, and Egypt. 
22 In the case of industrial change, measured either by mgr or mx, the number of countries showing little 
or no response to the assumed policy changes is even slightly larger (28 countries or 38 % in the case of mx). 
The pattern is similar for financial depth (fd), with 24 countries or 33 % showing little or no response to the 
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where: 
th i Yi = performance variable (and  i = 1,…, 6), 
Xj =
th j policy variable (and  j = 2,…, 8), 
e (Yi ) = policy response elasticity of Yi . 
 
The countries are then ranked by these elasticity estimates for each performance 
variable and these rankings are compared and correlated with the ranking of countries 
according to the B-F Index. Table 6 presents these rankings and the estimated rank 
correlation coefficients. The rank correlation coefficients range from 0.95 and 0.96 for 
the growth performance variables (gdpgr and pcgdpgr, respectively) to 0.90 for some of 
the structural variables (s and fd), confirming a strong positive correlation between 
performance responses, especially in terms of economic growth, and the B-F Index. 
These results demonstrate that when countries, with very different public-private 
sector relationships, adopt the same pro-growth and development policies, even at the 
dosage levels found in the world’s most successful developing countries, the 
performance response among the countries is likely to be mixed and significantly muted 
in those countries with unfriendly or uncooperative public-private sector relationships. 
The relevance of this case is underscored by the fact that many countries did, in fact, 
move towards more open, competitive and market-friendly policy regimes during the 
last decade, but often the expected spurt in growth did not occur. This has given rise to 
disappointment and disillusionment, sometimes with the policies themselves. However, 
the results presented here suggest that one possible cause for this stubbornly sluggish 
response may be a mistrustful or non-cooperative working relationship between the 
public and private sectors. This may help to explain in part the less than stellar 
performance of some of the growth laggards of late (e.g., Pakistan and Bangladesh in 
South Asia, Nigeria in Africa, Guatemala in Central America and Bolivia in South 
America), despite recent concerted policy reform efforts. All of these countries have low 
policy response elasticities as well as low B-F scores. Rather than abandoning the 
policies, these countries would be well advised to improve public-private sector 
relationships in order to realize the full impact of the policy reforms that are introduced.   
 
 
5.    THE RELEVANCE OF THE EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
The B-F scores indicate that the governments of the high-performing East Asian 
economies did maintain strong business-friendly ties with the private sector. Although 
these findings apply only to the last two decades (1980-97), other accounts (Leipziger 
and Thomas (1993)) suggest that these countries probably had close and productive PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  19 
public-private sector relationships almost from the beginning of their economic ascent in 
the 1960s. Stiglitz (1996) notes that throughout most of this period, these governments 
proactively coordinated and administered selective industrialization strategies that 
required a close working relationship with the private sector. What is striking is that 
these moderately interventionist industrial policies succeeded for the most part (Rodrik 
(1995)), whereas in many, if not most, other countries they failed. While many reasons 
have been given, one factor frequently cited is the high caliber of the East Asian 
government bureaucracies, which relates directly to the issue of public-private sector 
relationships. 
These government bureaucracies, comprising highly trained civil servants, not only 
provided policy advice to the country’s leaders, they also served as instruments of 
coordination and interface with the private sector. In some countries, deliberation or 
business councils were introduced with the aim of promoting public-private sector 
collaboration (Stiglitz (1996)). These councils went a long way towards creating an 
atmosphere of cooperation and trust. Furthermore, by fostering a professional work 
environment, these bureaucracies, or meritocracies as they have been called, remained 
largely insulated from political interference and corruption. Recruitment and promotion 
were based largely on merit and to attract and retain the best staff, compensation 
packages, including salaries and benefits, were maintained at highly competitive levels 
(World Bank (1993)). 
However, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, evidence has emerged 
suggesting that several governments may have recently slipped into less healthy ties 
with the private sector. Problems of cronyism, corruption and general rent seeking are 
cited. The B-F Index values for these countries, during the few years leading up to the 
Asian financial crisis (1994-97), however, present a more mixed picture, with Korea 
recording a small decline in B-F scores, Thailand a leveling off from the previous 
upward trend, and both Malaysia and Singapore showing a small but steady 
improvement. Thus, although the evidence is not overwhelming, some deterioration in 
the quality of public-private sector relationships appears to have taken place in at least 
some of the East Asian countries during the 1990s.
23  These changes highlight the risk of 
state capture and of the need for countries to adapt to changing conditions. As the East 
Asian economies grew and the private sector developed, instead of shifting to a less 
 
23 Some have concluded that one of the major causes of the Asian financial crisis was, in fact, such 
changes (Yoo (1997), Krugman (1998), and Frankel (1998)). They argue, although from different 
perspectives, that in several countries, the government and the private sector became too closely allied, 
leading to moral hazard and a host of related adverse selection problems. Others (Radelet and Sachs (2000)) 
maintain that moral hazard, while a factor, cannot adequately explain the onset of the Asian financial crisis or 
the virulence of the contagion that ensued. However, while the specific role and relative importance of 
cronyism in the Asian financial crisis is still debated, it is probably safe to conclude that public-private sector 
relationships did deteriorate to some degree in the 1990s.   MARTIN J. STAAB  20 
nurturing, albeit business-friendly relationship, many East Asian governments continued 
to maintain the same close associations with the private sector. Eventually this led to a 
degree of state capture, suggesting that the appropriate or optimal public-private sector 
relationship probably varies with a country’s stage of development.
24  
However, overall, the East Asian experience illustrates the advantages of forging 
close and cooperative public-private sector relationships. Throughout most of the period, 
during which the high-performing East Asian economies grew at unprecedented rates, 
strong and collaborative public-private sector relationships thrived and were actively 
promoted. East Asia’s business-friendly model appears to have served these countries 
extremely well. More recent events, which highlight the risks of state capture,
 should not 
obscure this more fundamental positive lesson. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Developing countries with business-friendly governments have generally performed 
better than countries where this relationship has suffered. In addition, countries with 
more business-friendly public-private sector relationships have responded more 
positively to pro-growth policy reforms, which may explain, in part, why some countries, 
with similar liberalized policy regimes, do not perform as well. Thus, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom in industrialized countries, which holds that governments should 
remain at arms-length distance, the findings presented here suggest that benign 
neutrality is probably not an optimal model of governance for many developing 
countries. It is not enough for governments in developing countries to adopt policy 
reforms; they must also seek to forge effective partnerships with the principal agents 
affected by those reforms. 
However, at the same time, governments need to learn how to avoid capture and be 
able to support the private sector without having this relationship degenerate into the all 
too familiar forms of corruption, cronyism and nepotism. As the early experience of 
many East Asian countries indicates, maintaining a merit-based, well trained and 
competitively compensated government bureaucracy can help to minimize this risk. 
Unfortunately, governments in many developing countries often either fail to avoid 
capture or operate at the other extreme where they are antagonistic or openly hostile to 
 
24 At an early stage, the private sector may be relatively underdeveloped; or businesses and entrepreneurs 
may lack critical information and experience; or investment opportunities, vital to the development of the 
country, may go unrealized because there is no effective coordination. In these cases, strongly supportive 
public-private sector relationships may be required. As countries grow and develop, less supportive 
relationships may be more appropriate. However, as the Asian experience indicates, such transitions are 
difficult to accomplish and may explain in part why developed countries tend to recommend a more neutral 
stance in the first place. PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  21 
the private sector. Neither of these two extremes appears to work. The most successful 
developing countries have been able to find the right middle ground. In part, this is the 
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